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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
menced an action in the Queens County Civil Court against a hotel
located about one hundred miles from New York City. Predicating per-
sonal jurisdiction under CCA 404(a)(1), the plaintiff argued that since
the hotel (1) advertised almost exclusively in New York City newspapers
and in the yellow pages of the City's telephone directories, and (2) ob-
tained a major portion of its revenue from patronage by City residents,
the defendant transacted business within the City. The court agreed.
It held that "the total activity of the defendant in New York City
demonstrates an '. . . extensive purposeful activity here without ever
actually setting foot in the...' City."2 5
REAL PROPERTY AcTIONs AND PROCEEDINGS LAW
RPAPL 735: Substituted service insufficient to allow judgment for rent
against defaulting tenant.
In a summary proceeding to regain possession of property, either
in personam or in rem jurisdiction can be acquired. Under RPAPL
735, in rem jurisdiction can be obtained by conspicuous posting of a
copy of a summons on the property which is sought to be recovered and
by the mailing of a copy to the defendant at the address of that prop-
erty.200 Due diligence need not be exercised before resort to this method
of service.207
Under CPLR 308(4), personal jurisdiction can be acquired by
"affixing the summons to the door of either the actual place of business,
dwelling place or usual place of abode within the state of the person
to be served and by mailing the summons to such person at his last
known residence."208 This method of service may be used after due
diligence has been exercised, i.e., after "a reasonable number of at-
tempts have been made at service under [CPLR 308] subdivisions (1)
and (2) ... 09
205 Id. at 1002, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 919-20, quoting Parke-Bernet Galleries v. Franklyn, 26
N.Y.2d 13, 17, 256 N.E.2d 506, 508, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340 (1970).
206 Since substituted service in a summary proceeding is an alternative, and not
an exception to personal service, it is not necessary to establish that personal
service could not be effected before resorting to substituted service, unless a
personal money judgment is sought.
14 CARmODY-WArr 2d 90:225, at 181 (1967).
207 RPAPL 735 lacks a "due diligence" requirement. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.
v. Rossi, 45 Misc. 2d 427, 428, 257 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).
"[T]he Legislature never intended the substituted service under section 735 of the Real
Property Actions and Proceedings Law to be the equivalent of substituted service under
CPLR 808(4)." 1405 Realty Corp. v. Napier, 68 Misc. 2d 793, 794, 328 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1971).
208 CPLR 508(4).
209 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 308, commentary at 208 (1972). See 1 WK&M 308.14
(1971).
[VCol. 47:148
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
In 1405 Realty Corp. v. Napier,210 a process server visited the de-
fendants' apartment twice, but failed to personally serve them. He then
resorted to RPAPL 735's alternative method of service. Since the re-
quirements of this section had been complied with, a judgment for
possession was granted. However, the judgment did not include accrued
rent, since the place of service requirements of CPLR 308(4) had not
been met.211 The court emphasized that, as to the places where service
is to be made under CPLR 308(4) and RPAPL 735, there is "a differ-
ence of substance, not a mere semantical distinction."2 12 It noted: "The
former requirement is calculated to acquire jurisdiction of the person;
the latter seeks only jurisdiction of the res."213
DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK PRACICE
Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: A Revolution in New York Law
Introduction
In Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.,1 the New York Court of Appeals
recently recognized the right of one charged solely with active negli-
gence to obtain indemnification from other persons sharing responsibil-
ity for the plaintiff's damages. Liability is now to be apportioned among
the several tortfeasors, on the basis of the "relative responsibility" of
each.2 Prior to Dole, the right to indemnification was limited to situa-
tions where a passive tortfeasor sought recovery over from an active
tortfeasor. Additionally, CPLR 1401 allowed contribution where a joint
tortfeasor paid more than his pro rata share of a joint judgment.
The following example illustrates the operation of this rule of
apportionment. X, while on the premises of Y!, was injured due to a
dangerous condition created by the negligence of Z. Y, who was aware
of the danger, permitted X to enter the premises anyway. Prior to Dole,
if Y were sued individually, he would bear the entire loss, with no re-
course against Z for X's injuries.3 However, Dole vests in Y! the right
either to implead Z or to institute a separate action against Z, and thus
be indemnified for that portion of the plaintiff's recovery attributable
to Z's negligence.
21068 Misc. 2d 793, 328 N.Y.S.2d 44 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1971).
211 Id. at 795, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 46.
212 Id.
213 Id.
1 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1972).
2 Id. at 153, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
3"[Flailure to act after actual knowledge of the existence of the dangerous condition
... spells out active negligence." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Costanzi, 140
N.Y.S.2d 185, 188 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1955).
1972]
